Cuba Archive Accuses State of Using Therapies and Drugs to Punish Opponents

 

Documents in the archives of the German political police give an account, as late as 1981, of the Cuban request for a list of 16 drugs designed to psychologically destabilize prisoners who had committed crimes against state security, including cocaine, LSD, methadone and various barbiturates.

In a letter to the Stasi, Cuban Colonel Lorenzo Hernando Caldeiro asks “to exchange opinions and experiences in psychology” to “use these branches of science in the fight against the enemy” and confirms an agreement to send psychologists from the island to various institutions in Germany as part of the 1988 “Exchange Work Plan.”

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CUBA ARCHIVO

Our Comrades in Havana

https://youtu.be/--pF1ndld4Q?is=ndQK9Ien7QLcL-H0

Join Radoslav Yordanov (Harvard University) for a discussion on his book, Our Comrades in Havana.  In the immediate aftermath of its successful revolution, Cuba was heralded by socialist nations as the vanguard of communism in Latin America. But by the late 1980s, Havana’s relationship with the Soviet-led socialist bloc had soured over its inability to adopt modes of socialist planning and Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. Yordanov examines Cuba’s ideological, political, and economic relations with the Eastern European states. Eastern European diplomats were entrusted with the task of educating local Cuban leadership in the intricacies of Marxism-Leninism, steering Cuba's governors onto the "correct path of development," helping them eradicate "erroneous ideas" of economic development, and showing them the validity of socialist "morals and ideology." By analyzing Eastern European diplomats' and specialists’ experiences in Havana from the 1959 Cuban revolutionary victory to the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, he sheds new light on Cuba's role in the global Cold War

Operational Disinformation

 By Jorge L. García Vázquez 

       Havana-Berlin Connection 

The East German intelligence service (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung) advised Cuba's Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence on how to implement disinformation and influence tactics, and how to train double agents. Documents from the Stasi archives confirm this.

I am not referring to the disinformation and propaganda that the regime publicly disseminates through its agents of influence in the media and on social networks or its supporters. Rather, I am referring to those who carry out operational disinformation from strategic positions. This constitutes another category within the processes of disinformation and influence.

The Cuban espionage apparatus remains intact. It has undoubtedly suffered setbacks, but they have not affected its superstructure or weakened its operational capacity. The Directorate of Intelligence has demonstrated its ability to recover quickly and exploit its enemy's weaknesses.

The U.S. intelligence community was slow to react to subversive activities and espionage operations launched from Havana. Cuban infiltration and penetration of government and academic structures has been successful.

February 1987, Excerpt from a letter by Brigadier General Eladio Sánchez, second-in-command of the Counterintelligence Directorate, to the Stasi:

"Our goal is to deepen our understanding of operational activity and the ability of our agents to influence and be influential in the conduct and assessments of enemy intelligence officers and analysts. We also aim to improve the preparation and use of penetration agents in influence and operational disinformation tasks during direct contact with officers and analysts of American intelligence services."

Ana Montes, a Cuban spy, carried out effective operational disinformation activities.

I do not believe the United States can effectively dismantle Cuba's support networks and structures because they are embedded in American society's academic, union, and religious sectors.