Operational Disinformation

 By Jorge L. García Vázquez 

       Havana-Berlin Connection 

The East German intelligence service (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung) advised Cuba's Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence on how to implement disinformation and influence tactics, and how to train double agents. Documents from the Stasi archives confirm this.

I am not referring to the disinformation and propaganda that the regime publicly disseminates through its agents of influence in the media and on social networks or its supporters. Rather, I am referring to those who carry out operational disinformation from strategic positions. This constitutes another category within the processes of disinformation and influence.

The Cuban espionage apparatus remains intact. It has undoubtedly suffered setbacks, but they have not affected its superstructure or weakened its operational capacity. The Directorate of Intelligence has demonstrated its ability to recover quickly and exploit its enemy's weaknesses.

The U.S. intelligence community was slow to react to subversive activities and espionage operations launched from Havana. Cuban infiltration and penetration of government and academic structures has been successful.

February 1987, Excerpt from a letter by Brigadier General Eladio Sánchez, second-in-command of the Counterintelligence Directorate, to the Stasi:

"Our goal is to deepen our understanding of operational activity and the ability of our agents to influence and be influential in the conduct and assessments of enemy intelligence officers and analysts. We also aim to improve the preparation and use of penetration agents in influence and operational disinformation tasks during direct contact with officers and analysts of American intelligence services."

Ana Montes, a Cuban spy, carried out effective operational disinformation activities.

I do not believe the United States can effectively dismantle Cuba's support networks and structures because they are embedded in American society's academic, union, and religious sectors.

 "THE CIA'S WAR AGAINST           CUBA"

By Jorge L García Vázquez 

 "The CIA's War Against Cuba" is a series produced by Cuban Television and the Ministry of the Interior (MININT), from 1987. 

On September 1, 1988, the Stasi received copies, which, according to Cuban State Security, presented evidence of "psychological warfare, ideological diversionism and attempted attacks against Comrade Fidel Castro."

In a report dated September 3, 1987, the East German Intelligence Directorate (HVA) reported on a meeting between General Manolo (Manuel Fernández Crespo ), Chief of Counterespionage, and his replacement, Brigadier General Sánchez , with State Security liaison officers from socialist countries stationed in Havana.

According to the report, Cuban counterintelligence had received orders from Fidel Castro, since 1985, to compile film footage and evidence of CIA activities against Cuba, which were not intended to be made public. The report states that the political and operational situation of recent months made its release necessary for the following reasons:

- the betrayal of General del Pino

- the corruption case of Luis Orlando Domínguez

- defection of Azpillaga Lombard, an officer of the Directorate of Intelligence 

- The CIA's aggressive stance against Cuba, despite Fidel Castro's warnings to the head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana

Ultimately, it was the defection of Major Florentino Aspillaga that led Fidel Castro and the MININT to make this decision, pressured by the tense operational situation unleashed by the Cuban agent, very similar to the damage caused by Stasi spy agent Werner Stiller  a few years earlier.

According to the report by Cuban counterintelligence officers, the film footage and the statements of agents and collaborators, the series would have fulfilled its objective.

 "General Manolo believes that the political-operational measure dealt a significant blow to Western intelligence services, and especially to the CIA."

The Cuban side stated that "a preliminary analysis of the reaction to the series confirms a strong sense of insecurity among diplomats accredited in Cuba, mutual suspicions, and a avoidance of contact with U.S. diplomats."

Cuban counterintelligence reported that the "success of this operation is due to an operational tactic of State Security, since 1980, against espionage services, which underestimated the technical-operational capacity of Cuban counterintelligence."

General Manolo noted that on Sundays no operational checks were carried out by counterintelligence officers, but this was compensated for by the employment of 2,000 collaborators trained for observation.

"State Security acted in this way for years, which led the CIA to believe that on Sundays or holidays, counterintelligence did not implement strong control measures and there were favorable conditions for operational activities."

Another method employed was the secret search of the homes of "CIA agents." Using collaborators trained for this purpose (the operation lasted 3 to 5 minutes), more than 2,000 important photographs were obtained. The operational technique and the application of nearly 100 observation points were effectively used, which helped to identify the agents, the time, and the location of their activities.

The MININT also reported on the increase in female personnel by the Central Intelligence Agency in recent years, especially the operational participation of the wives of agents stationed in Cuba.

 From the Mariel boatlift in 1980, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, the participation of Cuban troops in the Angolan war, and the defections of officers from State Security and the Armed Forces, Fidel Castro's power began to show cracks.

A short time later came, with Perestroika and Glasnost, the predicted end of socialism in Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and of course the final blow that ended the legend of the invulnerability of the Communist Party of Cuba: the trials and executions of General Ochoa and Colonel Antonio de la Guardia, accused of drug trafficking and corruption.

The arrests and trials ( Noriega in Panama, after the American invasion, and of the Cuban Minister of the Interior, José Abrantes) closed the red circle of the "Cuban revolution." The Castro myth was exposed.

Source: Stasi Archive, Berlin.

Monograph and Research by the author: "Havana-Berlin Connection. State Secrets and Notes on the Collaboration between the Stasi and the MININT." 

 (The article was published in the Misceláneas de Cuba Magazine, Sweden.2008)

https://stasi-minint.blogspot.com/2020/05/la-guerra-de-la-cia-contra-cuba-un.html?m=1

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Soviet Active Measures

 

       

      https://youtu.be/SRmYd6foFc4?si=SKGDIR1DRnDrcSyJ

https://stbnobrasil.com/pt/category/artigos-em-portugues-pt

When Spies Become Diplomats. By Chris Simmons

 

When Spies Become Diplomats.

By Chris Simmons

AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes #11-08 dated 17 March 2008

Since the earliest days of the Castro regime, the Cuban government has used diplomatic cover for its spies. Among them are Felix Wilson and José Imperatori, both of whom served at the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. 

However, the choice of René Mujica Cantelar as Cuba's ambassador to the United Kingdom highlights a disturbing new trend. During extensive discussions during the past months, two former Cuban intelligence officers who are now in the United States identified Mujica as a deep-cover spy in Cuba's foreign-intelligence service, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).

Mujica spent his earlier years in U.S. posts.

 He served at the Cuban Interests Section in 1977-1986 and then at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) in 1990-93. Juan Antonio Rodriguez Menier - who served with the DI's predecessor, the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI), for 28 years - noted that both of Mujica's U.S. postings carried the rank of first secretary. Historically, the DI uses senior diplomatic positions only for its higher-ranking officers.

Additionally, Mujica is apparently highly trusted by Raúl Castro, given that his CMUN assignment followed a devastating 1989 restructuring and downsizing of the DGI into the DI.

In the wake of the 1989 arrest and execution of Division Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa, Castro and the Ministry of the Armed Forces took control of the Interior Ministry (MININT). Army Corps Gen. Abelardo Colome Ibarra became the interior minister and conducted a massive purge. Armed forces officers loyal to Castro replaced hundreds of MININT/DGI officers who were jailed, fired or retired.

After a few years back at DI headquarters, Mujica was transferred to Europe, where he spent six years as ambassador to Brussels (1996-2002) and another three as deputy director of the Europe Division. There, he worked for better E.U.-Cuban relations and recommended the E.U. rethink its position on Cuba. Mujica sees signs of warming European-Cuban relations but fears that E.U. enlargement may slow rapprochement since some new pro-American members tend to take a hard-line position.

Since his posting to London, Mujica is focused on stronger bilateral relations with the United Kingdom. He is a strong and vocal critic of Bush administration measures intended to hasten the end of the Castro brothers' rule, including tightened restrictions on family visits and remittances from Cuban Americans - funds now critical to the regime's survival.

According to former DI officer Juan Reyes-Alonso, Mujica's diplomat postings were intended to improve his cover for intelligence missions. Now, he enjoys the best of both worlds. As a deep-cover DI officer, he does not meet with regular DI assets like traditional intelligence officers at an embassy. This has kept him ''off the radar'' of foreign counterintelligence services and their surveillance teams. As a result, he is living the dream of DI officers and diplomats - he has little direct supervision and enjoys considerable freedom of movement. [Simmons/MiamiHerald/11March2008] 

https://stasi-minint.blogspot.com/2025/04/tras-la-ruta-de-los-agentes.html

 

• The shoot-down was a conspiracy. The indictment accuses Raúl Castro and several Cuban military officers of participating in a conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals by targeting Brothers to the Rescue aircraft in February 1996.
• The operation was ordered at the highest levels of the Cuban government. According to prosecutors, all orders flowed through the Cuban military chain of command with Raul and Fidel Castro “as the final decision makers.”
• By Antonio  María  Delgado/ Miami Herald 
• ‐--------

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cuba/2026-05-19/cuba-declassified-records-brothers-rescue-shootdown?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=d794cf42-039a-4428-9001-59f971d1dfce

 

Cuba Celebrates Raúl Castro After U.S. Accuses Him of Murder

Cuban officials closed ranks around Mr. Castro, their embattled former president, who was indicted on murder charges in the downing of two civilian planes 30 years ago.

Former Cuban President Raúl Castro, center, at May Day celebrations in Havana earlier this month.Credit…Yamil Lage/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Chris Simmons/ Cuba Confidential

 

Former CIA Director Robert Gates says the biggest national security risk posed by Cuba to the U.S. is "another Mariel evacuation… that has tens of thousands of Cubans heading to the United States out of desperation."

   https://x.com/i/status/2055374398891110691

"They have been involved in ways that have impacted our national security and our interests in their engagement in other countries for a long time," he tells @margbrennan, noting how Cuban security forces were in Venezuela protecting then-President Nicolás Maduro.

"But, are they an imminent threat to the United States? Other than in these, if you will, peripheral ways, I think the main threat is, frankly, is collapse," he says.