Tuesday, October 20, 2026

East German State Security as Mentor to the Cuban Political Police

 


 East German State Security as Mentor to the Cuban Political Police

         By Jorge L. García Vázquez

A CUBAN IN THE SIGHTS OF THE STASI

         HAVANA-BERLIN CONNECTION

A RESEARCH AND EYEWITNESS REPORT 


 The two Cuban intelligence officers were in a hurry when they entered the house at Oberseestraße 66 in Berlin on February 2, 1981. They handed their German counterparts from the Ministry for State Security (MfS) a wish list of materials and requested that the order be fulfilled by February 17, 1981. The MfS officers from Department 26 and the Operational-Technical Sector (OTS ) assured the officers of an immediate review and possible provision of the materials. 


The request concerned the creation of an operationally and technically secure space for Cuban state security in the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in East Berlin.This was reportedly not an isolated incident . The operational group of the Cuban secret police, which was and still is a subdivision of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT), maintained close ties with the MfS." Specifically, the issue concerned a room on the fourth floor of the Cuban embassy on Berliner Straße in Berlin-Pankow, which was to be better and more securely equipped for the secret police activities of some Caribbean "diplomats." Many Cuban agents used diplomatic immunity as a cover for their "political-operational" activities in East and West Berlin or in West Germany. 

The Cuban ambassador in Berlin repeatedly awarded Cuban Orders of Merit to employees of the Ministry for State Security (MfS) or the Ministry of the Interior (MdI) for their cooperation. Erich Mielke, a close friend of Raúl Castro, received a certificate of honor from the ambassador in 1983 on the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations between East Germany and Cuba. Additionally, East German diplomats in Cuba placed great importance on close relations with the Cuban security services.

 In 1988, on the 39th anniversary of the GDR's founding, the GDR ambassador in Havana hosted a reception for senior MININT staff. Among the guests were Interior Minister Abrantes and the heads of intelligence and counterintelligence.

Until the late 1970s, numerous meetings took place at the Cuban embassy in East Berlin between the MININT liaison officer and his GDR counterparts. Later, clandestine Stasi facilities were preferred. 

A closer examination of the role of former embassy secretary Juan Miguel Roque Ramirez reveals the extent to which the Cuban secret police carried out various operational tasks in the GDR. Colonel Roque officially served as embassy secretary, but unofficially, as an experienced intelligence officer, he acted as a liaison to the Stasi. Together with the Stasi, he ensured the security and "monitoring of Cubans working in the GDR. He was also responsible for expanding the unofficial network among the Cubans who were studying or working in the GDR. At the same time, Colonel Roque coordinated the delivery of equipment and materials between the secret police forces of the GDR and Cuba. 

A MININT officer, subordinate to him and officially serving as vice-consul, was responsible for carrying out counterintelligence work and monitoring the Cuban contract workers. He  coordinated cooperation with the Stasi's investigative unit and the state prosecutor. An important task of this "vice-consul" was also the "operational penetration" of the connections between GDR and FRG citizens and the Cuban workers. Although he was not authorized to make arrests, searches, or interrogations in the GDR, he was permitted to summon Cuban contract workers to the embassy premises and question them there. MININT officers with diplomatic passports were also deployed in the GDR districts, maintaining close contact with the operational group in Berlin and with the district headquarters of the Stasi.

Roque's activities became public knowledge when the West German terrorist Johannes Weinrich , a member of the Carlos Group , was put on trial in 2003.

Two letters from Roque to the Stasi revealed that he had met with Weinrich and Gerd Albartus, alias "Kai," a member of the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), in the spring of 1984.

The report will soon be published as an e-book. 

Jorge Luis García Vázquez is a Cuban-born dissident, researcher, and human rights activist whose personal history and current research directly tie into the historic collaboration between the East German Stasi and the Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MININT). 

The connection manifests in two primary ways: through his personal history as a victim of their joint espionage operations in the 1980s, and through his modern investigative work exposing their shared historical archives. 

 The Historical Background: Stasi & MININT
Since the 1960s, the East German State Security (Stasi) maintained a highly active partnership with Cuba's Ministry of the Interior (MININT). The Stasi essentially helped build, train, and structurally supply Cuba’s domestic intelligence apparatus. 

The Stasi provided technical gear, wiretapping infrastructure, and specialized surveillance training.MININT (specifically its G2 intelligence unit) focused on counterintelligence, monitoring the general population, and spying on Cuban nationals residing in or visiting East Germany (DDR). 

García Vázquez as a Target (1980s)

Born in Havana in 1959, García Vázquez arrived in the DDR (Chemnitz)1982 to work as a translator and interpreter for Cuban contract workers (Vertragsarbeiter). 

The Recruitment Attempt: Because of his position and access, MININT agents operating inside East Germany targeted him, attempting to force him to spy on his fellow countrymen and act as an informant. 

The Arrest & Extradition: Refusing to cooperate, García Vázquez attempted to defect and escape the DDR. In March 1987, he was arrested. While the Stasi was involved in the initial containment, historical records show that Stasi chief Erich Mielke coordinated directly with the Cuban Interior Minister to hand him over. He was held in isolation for days before being forcibly flown back to Cuba to face interrogation by MININT. 

The Connection: The "Stasi-MININT" Research

Today García Vázquez lives in Berlin as a German citizen and acts as a primary witness and researcher of this era. He leverages Germany's open Stasi archives to expose the exact scope of the Stasi-MININT alliance. 

The Stasi-MININT Project: He directs specialized research initiatives and blogs (such as the Stasi-Minint project / Havana-Berlin Connection) dedicated to publishing declassified documents. 

Historical Revelations: His work has uncovered extensive operations showing how MININT officers routinely embedded themselves within the Cuban Embassy, blackmailed Cuban artists touring Europe, and even coordinated forced labor arrangements using Western corporations (such as documented historical links involving IKEA production in Cuban prisons). He regularly works with human rights organizations like the International Society for Human Rights 

Friday, October 16, 2026

 

Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI)

The principal intelligence collection arms of the Cuban government are the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) of Ministry of the Interior, and the Military Counterintelligence Department of the Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces. Both have been closely associated with the Soviet and Russian intelligence services. The relationship between these services is likely to continue based upon the June 14, 1993 agreement on military cooperation between Russia and Cuba.

GlobalSecurity

Sunday, October 11, 2026

The repressive methods of the Stasi in service to Cuban State Security.

 This is an excerpt from the research on the Havana-Berlin connection.

By Jorge L. García Vázquez 


The Cuban State Security Service has been known to use repressive methods against members of the opposition movement.

The Castro regime remains in power due to its aggressive, repressive apparatus: a political police force that harasses, imprisons, mistreats, and physically and psychologically tortures the opposition movement, while constantly intimidating its members.


Foto: BStA/EBW PH 1101652


In addition to the political and economic factors prevailing in the 1980s, one of the fundamental causes that accelerated the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the communist dictatorship in East Germany was the State Security’s reaction to the situation that arose in the wake of the popular protests.

The GDR’s political police were unprepared to disperse the demonstrations and unable to halt the activities of opposition and Protestant church groups using political and operational measures. These actions were asymmetrical and spontaneous. The Socialist Party and its shield and sword, the Stasi, began to crumble. The repressive machinery ceased to function effectively.



The Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MININT) appear to have learned from the mistakes of their former ally, as well as from nearly 30 years of cooperation.
The Cuban political police are attempting to stifle and liquidate the Cuban opposition psychologically and economically to prevent a chain reaction of events that could lead to mass protests.

I believe the MININT is preparing for a transition or an operational situation similar to Berlin in 1989, adjusting its structures and financial resources accordingly.

A 1974 Stasi document, handed over to MININT, outlines the methodology and provides recommendations to MININT. The document details methods for dismantling dissident and opposition groups through harassment, psychological terror, and operational measures. 


Translated with DeepL.com 

Sunday, September 6, 2026

The Shadow of the Stasi. By Jorge L. García Vázquez

The Shadow of the Stasi
 By Jorge L. García Vázquez

The Havana-Berlin Connection

These sources explore the close collaboration between the Ministry for State Security of former East Germany, known as the Stasi, and Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior (MININT).




Declassified documents and Vázquez's research reveal how the East German regime provided technical training in espionage, counterintelligence, communications, document forgery, and operational disguises for agents.

The texts portray MININT as a tool of political control and repression that adopted Stasi methods to monitor dissent and uphold the Castro regime's power structure. 

The texts also detail the exchange of intelligence, the supply of weapons, and mutual support agreements that bolstered the operational capacity of the Cuban political police during the Cold War.

Finally, the articles emphasize the lasting impact of these tactics on the Cuban government's infiltration and disinformation activities, both domestically and internationally.



Friday, August 21, 2026

Cuba Archive Accuses State of Using Therapies and Drugs to Punish Opponents

 


Documents in the archives of the German political police give an account, as late as 1981, of the Cuban request for a list of 16 drugs designed to psychologically destabilize prisoners who had committed crimes against state security, including cocaine, LSD, methadone and various barbiturates.

In a letter to the Stasi, Cuban Colonel Lorenzo Hernando Caldeiro asks “to exchange opinions and experiences in psychology” to “use these branches of science in the fight against the enemy” and confirms an agreement to send psychologists from the island to various institutions in Germany as part of the 1988 “Exchange Work Plan.”

14yMEDIO

CUBA ARCHIVO


Thursday, August 20, 2026

Our Comrades in Havana


https://youtu.be/--pF1ndld4Q?is=ndQK9Ien7QLcL-H0

Join Radoslav Yordanov (Harvard University) for a discussion on his book, Our Comrades in Havana.  In the immediate aftermath of its successful revolution, Cuba was heralded by socialist nations as the vanguard of communism in Latin America. But by the late 1980s, Havana’s relationship with the Soviet-led socialist bloc had soured over its inability to adopt modes of socialist planning and Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. Yordanov examines Cuba’s ideological, political, and economic relations with the Eastern European states. Eastern European diplomats were entrusted with the task of educating local Cuban leadership in the intricacies of Marxism-Leninism, steering Cuba's governors onto the "correct path of development," helping them eradicate "erroneous ideas" of economic development, and showing them the validity of socialist "morals and ideology." By analyzing Eastern European diplomats' and specialists’ experiences in Havana from the 1959 Cuban revolutionary victory to the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, he sheds new light on Cuba's role in the global Cold War