By Jorge L García Vázquez
On September 1, 1988, the Stasi received copies, which, according to Cuban State Security, presented evidence of "psychological warfare, ideological diversionism and attempted attacks against Comrade Fidel Castro."
According to the report, Cuban counterintelligence had received orders from Fidel Castro, since 1985, to compile film footage and evidence of CIA activities against Cuba, which were not intended to be made public. The report states that the political and operational situation of recent months made its release necessary for the following reasons:
- The CIA's aggressive stance against Cuba, despite Fidel Castro's warnings to the head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana
According to the report by Cuban counterintelligence officers, the film footage and the statements of agents and collaborators, the series would have fulfilled its objective.
"General Manolo believes that the political-operational measure dealt a significant blow to Western intelligence services, and especially to the CIA."
The Cuban side stated that "a preliminary analysis of the reaction to the series confirms a strong sense of insecurity among diplomats accredited in Cuba, mutual suspicions, and a avoidance of contact with U.S. diplomats."
Cuban counterintelligence reported that the "success of this operation is due to an operational tactic of State Security, since 1980, against espionage services, which underestimated the technical-operational capacity of Cuban counterintelligence."
General Manolo noted that on Sundays no operational checks were carried out by counterintelligence officers, but this was compensated for by the employment of 2,000 collaborators trained for observation.
"State Security acted in this way for years, which led the CIA to believe that on Sundays or holidays, counterintelligence did not implement strong control measures and there were favorable conditions for operational activities."
Another method employed was the secret search of the homes of "CIA agents." Using collaborators trained for this purpose (the operation lasted 3 to 5 minutes), more than 2,000 important photographs were obtained. The operational technique and the application of nearly 100 observation points were effectively used, which helped to identify the agents, the time, and the location of their activities.
The MININT also reported on the increase in female personnel by the Central Intelligence Agency in recent years, especially the operational participation of the wives of agents stationed in Cuba.
From the Mariel boatlift in 1980, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, the participation of Cuban troops in the Angolan war, and the defections of officers from State Security and the Armed Forces, Fidel Castro's power began to show cracks.
A short time later came, with Perestroika and Glasnost, the predicted end of socialism in Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and of course the final blow that ended the legend of the invulnerability of the Communist Party of Cuba: the trials and executions of General Ochoa and Colonel Antonio de la Guardia, accused of drug trafficking and corruption.
Source: Stasi Archive, Berlin.
Monograph and Research by the author: "Havana-Berlin Connection. State Secrets and Notes on the Collaboration between the Stasi and the MININT."
(The article was published in the Misceláneas de Cuba Magazine, Sweden.2008)
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