The Cuban Embassy to the United Nations: “Legal Center” of the Intelligence Directorate. By Jorge L. García Vázquez/

 

Upon coming to power, Fidel Castro began stationing Directorate of Intelligence officers at Cuba’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations. He eventually transformed the New York diplomatic mission into a "legal center" for espionage, disinformation, and influence operations.

By 1968, several Cuban intelligence officers were present in New York alongside Ambassador Ricardo Alarcón Quesada. Among them were Jorge Alberto Bolaños Suárez, Jorge Reyes Vega ("Joaquín"), and Rogelio Rodríguez López ("José Antonio"), all of whom were known intelligence service agents.

According to documents from the East German intelligence apparatus, the Stasi provided guidance to Cuban specialists regarding "United States–related" operations. This included vetting agents, methods for gathering information indirectly on U.S. government officials, deploying technical equipment at sites of operational interest, and a matter of great importance to Cuban intelligence: relaying urgent information from Washington to the "legal center" in New York. Source: Document dated April 23, 1986.

I recommend consulting the following valuable sources: Manuel Cereijo, Juan F. Benemelis, and Chris Simmons.

http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/avispa.htm

A CUBAN IN THE SIGHTS OF THE STASI

RESEARCH PROJECT BASED ON STASI FILES, ON THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SECRET SERVICES IN EAST BERLIN AND HAVANA. Please contact me if you are interested in a lecture.

 j.g.vazquez.hbc@gmail.com

In 1996, I gained access to my Stasi file. The dossier contains information about my contacts with American diplomats in Berlin, as well as reports on surveillance and interrogations. This information and further research form the basis for the research project.

The Documentation Office is an independent research center that focuses on the relationship between Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior and the repressive apparatuses and intelligence services of Eastern Europe, most notably the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) of the former German Democratic Republic (*Havana–Berlin Connection).

Source: CONEXIÓN HABANA-BERLIN 

The communication systems of the CIA, the Stasi,and Cuban State Security

Jorge Luis García Vázquez

Research Report

"Havana-Berlin Connection"

Point 6.2 of the collaboration protocol* between the radio-radio intelligence services:

                Source: Stasi Archive/

                 

"To deliver to the Ministry of State Security of the German Democratic Republic the recordings of all CIA equipment used in Cuba by "Agents" (Patriots*) for analysis and verification purposes..."

"The Ministry will send specialists to support the Cuban comrades in the search for possibilities to decipher the transmissions of the RS-804/CDS 501 system..." (point 2.3)

   
                                          Source: Cryptomuseum

* The agreement was signed by the then Minister of the Interior of Cuba, Ramiro Valdés, and the Minister for State Security, General Erich Mielke.

*Patriots: Double Agents

  East German Foreign Intelligence

 Previously, during an interview in Berlin, Ramiro Valdés had informed the head of the Stasi how Cuban State Security controlled the transmission equipment.

 Further information on the RS-804/CD-501 transmitter can be found at:

http://www.cryptomuseum.com/spy/rs804/index.htm

and http://www.cryptomuseum.com/spy/cds501/index.htm

East German State Security as Mentor to the Cuban Political Police

 

 East German State Security as Mentor to the Cuban Political Police

         By Jorge L. García Vázquez

A CUBAN IN THE SIGHTS OF THE STASI

         HAVANA-BERLIN CONNECTION

A RESEARCH AND EYEWITNESS REPORT 

 The two Cuban intelligence officers were in a hurry when they entered the house at Oberseestraße 66 in Berlin on February 2, 1981. They handed their German counterparts from the Ministry for State Security (MfS) a wish list of materials and requested that the order be fulfilled by February 17, 1981. The MfS officers from Department 26 and the Operational-Technical Sector (OTS ) assured the officers of an immediate review and possible provision of the materials. 

The request concerned the creation of an operationally and technically secure space for Cuban state security in the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in East Berlin.This was reportedly not an isolated incident . The operational group of the Cuban secret police, which was and still is a subdivision of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT), maintained close ties with the MfS." Specifically, the issue concerned a room on the fourth floor of the Cuban embassy on Berliner Straße in Berlin-Pankow, which was to be better and more securely equipped for the secret police activities of some Caribbean "diplomats." Many Cuban agents used diplomatic immunity as a cover for their "political-operational" activities in East and West Berlin or in West Germany. 

The Cuban ambassador in Berlin repeatedly awarded Cuban Orders of Merit to employees of the Ministry for State Security (MfS) or the Ministry of the Interior (MdI) for their cooperation. Erich Mielke, a close friend of Raúl Castro, received a certificate of honor from the ambassador in 1983 on the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations between East Germany and Cuba. Additionally, East German diplomats in Cuba placed great importance on close relations with the Cuban security services.

 In 1988, on the 39th anniversary of the GDR's founding, the GDR ambassador in Havana hosted a reception for senior MININT staff. Among the guests were Interior Minister Abrantes and the heads of intelligence and counterintelligence.

Until the late 1970s, numerous meetings took place at the Cuban embassy in East Berlin between the MININT liaison officer and his GDR counterparts. Later, clandestine Stasi facilities were preferred. 

A closer examination of the role of former embassy secretary Juan Miguel Roque Ramirez reveals the extent to which the Cuban secret police carried out various operational tasks in the GDR. Colonel Roque officially served as embassy secretary, but unofficially, as an experienced intelligence officer, he acted as a liaison to the Stasi. Together with the Stasi, he ensured the security and "monitoring of Cubans working in the GDR. He was also responsible for expanding the unofficial network among the Cubans who were studying or working in the GDR. At the same time, Colonel Roque coordinated the delivery of equipment and materials between the secret police forces of the GDR and Cuba. 

A MININT officer, subordinate to him and officially serving as vice-consul, was responsible for carrying out counterintelligence work and monitoring the Cuban contract workers. He  coordinated cooperation with the Stasi's investigative unit and the state prosecutor. An important task of this "vice-consul" was also the "operational penetration" of the connections between GDR and FRG citizens and the Cuban workers. Although he was not authorized to make arrests, searches, or interrogations in the GDR, he was permitted to summon Cuban contract workers to the embassy premises and question them there. MININT officers with diplomatic passports were also deployed in the GDR districts, maintaining close contact with the operational group in Berlin and with the district headquarters of the Stasi.

Roque's activities became public knowledge when the West German terrorist Johannes Weinrich , a member of the Carlos Group , was put on trial in 2003.

Two letters from Roque to the Stasi revealed that he had met with Weinrich and Gerd Albartus, alias "Kai," a member of the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), in the spring of 1984.

The report will soon be published as an e-book. 

Jorge Luis García Vázquez is a Cuban-born dissident,independent researcher and human rights activist whose personal history and current research directly tie into the historic collaboration between the East German Stasi and the Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MININT). 

The connection manifests in two primary ways: through his personal history as a victim of their joint espionage operations in the 1980s, and through his modern investigative work exposing their shared historical archives. 

 The Historical Background: Stasi & MININT

Since the 1960s, the East German State Security (Stasi) maintained a highly active partnership with Cuba's Ministry of the Interior (MININT). The Stasi essentially helped build, train, and structurally supply Cuba’s domestic intelligence apparatus. 

The Stasi provided technical gear, wiretapping infrastructure, and specialized surveillance training.MININT (specifically its G2 intelligence unit) focused on counterintelligence, monitoring the general population, and spying on Cuban nationals residing in or visiting East Germany (DDR). 

García Vázquez as a Target (1980s)

Born in Havana in 1959, García Vázquez arrived in the DDR (Chemnitz)1982 to work as a translator and interpreter for Cuban contract workers (Vertragsarbeiter). 

The Recruitment Attempt: Due to his position and access to classified information, MININT agents operating in East Germany targeted him and tried to convince him to spy on his compatriots and act as an informant.

The Arrest & Extradition: Refusing to cooperate, García Vázquez attempted to defect and escape the DDR. In March 1987, he was arrested. While the Stasi was involved in the initial containment, historical records show that Stasi chief Erich Mielke coordinated directly with the Cuban Interior Minister to hand him over. He was held in isolation for days before being forcibly flown back to Cuba to face interrogation by MININT. 

The Connection: The "Stasi-MININT" Research

Today García Vázquez lives in Berlin as a German citizen and acts as a primary witness and researcher of this era. He leverages Germany's open Stasi archives to expose the exact scope of the Stasi-MININT alliance. 

The Stasi-MININT Project: He directs specialized research initiatives and blogs (such as the Stasi-Minint project / Havana-Berlin Connection) dedicated to publishing declassified documents. 

Historical Revelations: His work has uncovered extensive operations showing how MININT officers routinely embedded themselves within the Cuban Embassy, blackmailed Cuban artists touring Europe, and even coordinated forced labor arrangements using Western corporations (such as documented historical links involving IKEA production in Cuban prisons). He regularly works with human rights organizations like the International Society for Human Rights.

 

Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI)

The principal intelligence collection arms of the Cuban government are the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) of Ministry of the Interior, and the Military Counterintelligence Department of the Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces. Both have been closely associated with the Soviet and Russian intelligence services. The relationship between these services is likely to continue based upon the June 14, 1993 agreement on military cooperation between Russia and Cuba.

GlobalSecurity

The repressive methods of the Stasi in service to Cuban State Security.

 This is an excerpt from the research on the Havana-Berlin connection.

By Jorge L. García Vázquez 

The Cuban State Security Service has been known to use repressive methods against members of the opposition movement.

The Castro regime remains in power due to its aggressive, repressive apparatus: a political police force that harasses, imprisons, mistreats, and physically and psychologically tortures the opposition movement, while constantly intimidating its members.

Foto: BStA/EBW PH 1101652

In addition to the political and economic factors prevailing in the 1980s, one of the fundamental causes that accelerated the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the communist dictatorship in East Germany was the State Security’s reaction to the situation that arose in the wake of the popular protests.

The GDR’s political police were unprepared to disperse the demonstrations and unable to halt the activities of opposition and Protestant church groups using political and operational measures. These actions were asymmetrical and spontaneous. The Socialist Party and its shield and sword, the Stasi, began to crumble. The repressive machinery ceased to function effectively.

The Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MININT) appear to have learned from the mistakes of their former ally, as well as from nearly 30 years of cooperation.

The Cuban political police are attempting to stifle and liquidate the Cuban opposition psychologically and economically to prevent a chain reaction of events that could lead to mass protests.

I believe the MININT is preparing for a transition or an operational situation similar to Berlin in 1989, adjusting its structures and financial resources accordingly.

A 1974 Stasi document, handed over to MININT, outlines the methodology and provides recommendations to MININT. The document details methods for dismantling dissident and opposition groups through harassment, psychological terror, and operational measures. 

CONEXIÓN HABANA-BERLIN 

Translated with DeepL.com 

 

https://amp.dw.com/en/berlin-businesswoman-charged-with-spying-for-russia/a-79258004

The Shadow of the Stasi. By Jorge L. García Vázquez

The Shadow of the Stasi

 By Jorge L. García Vázquez

The Havana-Berlin Connection

These sources explore the close collaboration between the Ministry for State Security of former East Germany, known as the Stasi, and Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior (MININT).

Declassified documents and Vázquez's research reveal how the East German regime provided technical training in espionage, counterintelligence, communications, document forgery, and operational disguises for agents.

The texts portray MININT as a tool of political control and repression that adopted Stasi methods to monitor dissent and uphold the Castro regime's power structure. 

The texts also detail the exchange of intelligence, the supply of weapons, and mutual support agreements that bolstered the operational capacity of the Cuban political police during the Cold War.

Finally, the articles emphasize the lasting impact of these tactics on the Cuban government's infiltration and disinformation activities, both domestically and internationally.

Cuba Archive Accuses State of Using Therapies and Drugs to Punish Opponents

 

Documents in the archives of the German political police give an account, as late as 1981, of the Cuban request for a list of 16 drugs designed to psychologically destabilize prisoners who had committed crimes against state security, including cocaine, LSD, methadone and various barbiturates.

In a letter to the Stasi, Cuban Colonel Lorenzo Hernando Caldeiro asks “to exchange opinions and experiences in psychology” to “use these branches of science in the fight against the enemy” and confirms an agreement to send psychologists from the island to various institutions in Germany as part of the 1988 “Exchange Work Plan.”

14yMEDIO

CUBA ARCHIVO

Our Comrades in Havana

https://youtu.be/--pF1ndld4Q?is=ndQK9Ien7QLcL-H0

Join Radoslav Yordanov (Harvard University) for a discussion on his book, Our Comrades in Havana.  In the immediate aftermath of its successful revolution, Cuba was heralded by socialist nations as the vanguard of communism in Latin America. But by the late 1980s, Havana’s relationship with the Soviet-led socialist bloc had soured over its inability to adopt modes of socialist planning and Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. Yordanov examines Cuba’s ideological, political, and economic relations with the Eastern European states. Eastern European diplomats were entrusted with the task of educating local Cuban leadership in the intricacies of Marxism-Leninism, steering Cuba's governors onto the "correct path of development," helping them eradicate "erroneous ideas" of economic development, and showing them the validity of socialist "morals and ideology." By analyzing Eastern European diplomats' and specialists’ experiences in Havana from the 1959 Cuban revolutionary victory to the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, he sheds new light on Cuba's role in the global Cold War

Operational Disinformation

 By Jorge L. García Vázquez 

       Havana-Berlin Connection 

The East German intelligence service (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung) advised Cuba's Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence on how to implement disinformation and influence tactics, and how to train double agents. Documents from the Stasi archives confirm this.

I am not referring to the disinformation and propaganda that the regime publicly disseminates through its agents of influence in the media and on social networks or its supporters. Rather, I am referring to those who carry out operational disinformation from strategic positions. This constitutes another category within the processes of disinformation and influence.

The Cuban espionage apparatus remains intact. It has undoubtedly suffered setbacks, but they have not affected its superstructure or weakened its operational capacity. The Directorate of Intelligence has demonstrated its ability to recover quickly and exploit its enemy's weaknesses.

The U.S. intelligence community was slow to react to subversive activities and espionage operations launched from Havana. Cuban infiltration and penetration of government and academic structures has been successful.

February 1987, Excerpt from a letter by Brigadier General Eladio Sánchez, second-in-command of the Counterintelligence Directorate, to the Stasi:

"Our goal is to deepen our understanding of operational activity and the ability of our agents to influence and be influential in the conduct and assessments of enemy intelligence officers and analysts. We also aim to improve the preparation and use of penetration agents in influence and operational disinformation tasks during direct contact with officers and analysts of American intelligence services."

Ana Montes, a Cuban spy, carried out effective operational disinformation activities.

I do not believe the United States can effectively dismantle Cuba's support networks and structures because they are embedded in American society's academic, union, and religious sectors.

 "THE CIA'S WAR AGAINST           CUBA"

By Jorge L García Vázquez 

 "The CIA's War Against Cuba" is a series produced by Cuban Television and the Ministry of the Interior (MININT), from 1987. 

On September 1, 1988, the Stasi received copies, which, according to Cuban State Security, presented evidence of "psychological warfare, ideological diversionism and attempted attacks against Comrade Fidel Castro."

In a report dated September 3, 1987, the East German Intelligence Directorate (HVA) reported on a meeting between General Manolo (Manuel Fernández Crespo ), Chief of Counterespionage, and his replacement, Brigadier General Sánchez , with State Security liaison officers from socialist countries stationed in Havana.

According to the report, Cuban counterintelligence had received orders from Fidel Castro, since 1985, to compile film footage and evidence of CIA activities against Cuba, which were not intended to be made public. The report states that the political and operational situation of recent months made its release necessary for the following reasons:

- the betrayal of General del Pino

- the corruption case of Luis Orlando Domínguez

- defection of Azpillaga Lombard, an officer of the Directorate of Intelligence 

- The CIA's aggressive stance against Cuba, despite Fidel Castro's warnings to the head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana

Ultimately, it was the defection of Major Florentino Aspillaga that led Fidel Castro and the MININT to make this decision, pressured by the tense operational situation unleashed by the Cuban agent, very similar to the damage caused by Stasi spy agent Werner Stiller  a few years earlier.

According to the report by Cuban counterintelligence officers, the film footage and the statements of agents and collaborators, the series would have fulfilled its objective.

 "General Manolo believes that the political-operational measure dealt a significant blow to Western intelligence services, and especially to the CIA."

The Cuban side stated that "a preliminary analysis of the reaction to the series confirms a strong sense of insecurity among diplomats accredited in Cuba, mutual suspicions, and a avoidance of contact with U.S. diplomats."

Cuban counterintelligence reported that the "success of this operation is due to an operational tactic of State Security, since 1980, against espionage services, which underestimated the technical-operational capacity of Cuban counterintelligence."

General Manolo noted that on Sundays no operational checks were carried out by counterintelligence officers, but this was compensated for by the employment of 2,000 collaborators trained for observation.

"State Security acted in this way for years, which led the CIA to believe that on Sundays or holidays, counterintelligence did not implement strong control measures and there were favorable conditions for operational activities."

Another method employed was the secret search of the homes of "CIA agents." Using collaborators trained for this purpose (the operation lasted 3 to 5 minutes), more than 2,000 important photographs were obtained. The operational technique and the application of nearly 100 observation points were effectively used, which helped to identify the agents, the time, and the location of their activities.

The MININT also reported on the increase in female personnel by the Central Intelligence Agency in recent years, especially the operational participation of the wives of agents stationed in Cuba.

 From the Mariel boatlift in 1980, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, the participation of Cuban troops in the Angolan war, and the defections of officers from State Security and the Armed Forces, Fidel Castro's power began to show cracks.

A short time later came, with Perestroika and Glasnost, the predicted end of socialism in Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and of course the final blow that ended the legend of the invulnerability of the Communist Party of Cuba: the trials and executions of General Ochoa and Colonel Antonio de la Guardia, accused of drug trafficking and corruption.

The arrests and trials ( Noriega in Panama, after the American invasion, and of the Cuban Minister of the Interior, José Abrantes) closed the red circle of the "Cuban revolution." The Castro myth was exposed.

Source: Stasi Archive, Berlin.

Monograph and Research by the author: "Havana-Berlin Connection. State Secrets and Notes on the Collaboration between the Stasi and the MININT." 

 (The article was published in the Misceláneas de Cuba Magazine, Sweden.2008)

https://stasi-minint.blogspot.com/2020/05/la-guerra-de-la-cia-contra-cuba-un.html?m=1

Traducción automática de Google 

Soviet Active Measures

 

       

      https://youtu.be/SRmYd6foFc4?si=SKGDIR1DRnDrcSyJ

https://stbnobrasil.com/pt/category/artigos-em-portugues-pt

When Spies Become Diplomats. By Chris Simmons

 

When Spies Become Diplomats.

By Chris Simmons

AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes #11-08 dated 17 March 2008

Since the earliest days of the Castro regime, the Cuban government has used diplomatic cover for its spies. Among them are Felix Wilson and José Imperatori, both of whom served at the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. 

However, the choice of René Mujica Cantelar as Cuba's ambassador to the United Kingdom highlights a disturbing new trend. During extensive discussions during the past months, two former Cuban intelligence officers who are now in the United States identified Mujica as a deep-cover spy in Cuba's foreign-intelligence service, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).

Mujica spent his earlier years in U.S. posts.

 He served at the Cuban Interests Section in 1977-1986 and then at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) in 1990-93. Juan Antonio Rodriguez Menier - who served with the DI's predecessor, the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI), for 28 years - noted that both of Mujica's U.S. postings carried the rank of first secretary. Historically, the DI uses senior diplomatic positions only for its higher-ranking officers.

Additionally, Mujica is apparently highly trusted by Raúl Castro, given that his CMUN assignment followed a devastating 1989 restructuring and downsizing of the DGI into the DI.

In the wake of the 1989 arrest and execution of Division Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa, Castro and the Ministry of the Armed Forces took control of the Interior Ministry (MININT). Army Corps Gen. Abelardo Colome Ibarra became the interior minister and conducted a massive purge. Armed forces officers loyal to Castro replaced hundreds of MININT/DGI officers who were jailed, fired or retired.

After a few years back at DI headquarters, Mujica was transferred to Europe, where he spent six years as ambassador to Brussels (1996-2002) and another three as deputy director of the Europe Division. There, he worked for better E.U.-Cuban relations and recommended the E.U. rethink its position on Cuba. Mujica sees signs of warming European-Cuban relations but fears that E.U. enlargement may slow rapprochement since some new pro-American members tend to take a hard-line position.

Since his posting to London, Mujica is focused on stronger bilateral relations with the United Kingdom. He is a strong and vocal critic of Bush administration measures intended to hasten the end of the Castro brothers' rule, including tightened restrictions on family visits and remittances from Cuban Americans - funds now critical to the regime's survival.

According to former DI officer Juan Reyes-Alonso, Mujica's diplomat postings were intended to improve his cover for intelligence missions. Now, he enjoys the best of both worlds. As a deep-cover DI officer, he does not meet with regular DI assets like traditional intelligence officers at an embassy. This has kept him ''off the radar'' of foreign counterintelligence services and their surveillance teams. As a result, he is living the dream of DI officers and diplomats - he has little direct supervision and enjoys considerable freedom of movement. [Simmons/MiamiHerald/11March2008] 

https://stasi-minint.blogspot.com/2025/04/tras-la-ruta-de-los-agentes.html

 

• The shoot-down was a conspiracy. The indictment accuses Raúl Castro and several Cuban military officers of participating in a conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals by targeting Brothers to the Rescue aircraft in February 1996.
• The operation was ordered at the highest levels of the Cuban government. According to prosecutors, all orders flowed through the Cuban military chain of command with Raul and Fidel Castro “as the final decision makers.”
• By Antonio  María  Delgado/ Miami Herald 
• ‐--------

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cuba/2026-05-19/cuba-declassified-records-brothers-rescue-shootdown?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=d794cf42-039a-4428-9001-59f971d1dfce

 

Cuba Celebrates Raúl Castro After U.S. Accuses Him of Murder

Cuban officials closed ranks around Mr. Castro, their embattled former president, who was indicted on murder charges in the downing of two civilian planes 30 years ago.

Former Cuban President Raúl Castro, center, at May Day celebrations in Havana earlier this month.Credit…Yamil Lage/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Chris Simmons/ Cuba Confidential

 

Former CIA Director Robert Gates says the biggest national security risk posed by Cuba to the U.S. is "another Mariel evacuation… that has tens of thousands of Cubans heading to the United States out of desperation."

   https://x.com/i/status/2055374398891110691

"They have been involved in ways that have impacted our national security and our interests in their engagement in other countries for a long time," he tells @margbrennan, noting how Cuban security forces were in Venezuela protecting then-President Nicolás Maduro.

"But, are they an imminent threat to the United States? Other than in these, if you will, peripheral ways, I think the main threat is, frankly, is collapse," he says.

CUBA- Double Agents During the Cold War

How East Germany Exported Its Repressive Stasi Security System to Cuba

 "Havana-Berlin Connection: State Secrets and Notes on the Collaboration Between the Stasi and the Cuban Ministry of the Interior."

Problems with Double Agents: The CIA and Double Agents During the Cold War

Eric O'Neill, a former FBI counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence operative, offered a similar assessment of Cuba's record on U.S. soil:"They have been eating our lunch," he said in a recent interview.

Chris Simmons, a U.S. counterintelligence officer and expert on Cuban intelligence: "East Germany played a fundamental role in developing Cuban counterintelligence and foreign intelligence services, providing training for decades until the end of the East German regime."

By Jorge L. García Vázquez

Saturday, April 7, 2018

According to declassified documents from the archives of the German Democratic Republic's political police, the Cuban Counterintelligence Directorate investigated the training of double agents and the refinement of operational games (operativnye igry) in 1989.

In March 1989, Lieutenant Colonel José Manuel Pérez Cernada of the Ministry of the Interior requested the support of the Stasi Counterintelligence Department. He wanted to obtain information on confessions from former CIA officers and agents discovered by the security agencies of socialist countries as soon as possible.

Pérez Cernada also requested information on the system of measures applied by the CIA in vetting agents of the security services of socialist countries involved in operational games.

Pérez Cernada requested examples of closed cases and operational criteria on the fundamental differences in the behavior of CIA vetting agents who reside permanently abroad versus those who travel abroad and contact the US special service.

He also wanted information on the training of operational game agents to evade enemy vetting.

Source: Stasi Archive

https://stasi-minint.blogspot.com/2015/11/la-preparacion-de-los-agentes-dobles.html

* operativnye igry 

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_B._Fischer

Fischer, B. B. (2016). Doubles Troubles: The CIA and Double Agents during the Cold War. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 29(1), 48–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2015.1083313

The Jackal's" commando had contacts with officers of Cuban intelligence, the DGI."

  

"Una vez más se evidenció que la Isla no alberga, no apoya, no financia ni permite organizaciones terroristas o extremistas; ni existen bases militares o de inteligencia extranjera en su territorio, y nunca ha apoyado ninguna actividad hostil contra EE.UU. ni permitirá que desde Cuba se actúe contra otra nación"

Información del gobierno revolucionario  : A partir de la solicitud presentada por el gobierno de EE.UU. de que se recibiera en La Habana una delegación presidida por el director de la CIA, John Ratcliffe.

Jorge L. García Vázquez 

Investigación  Conexión Habana-Berlín 

Las actividades de Roque* se hicieron públicas cuando el terrorista de Alemania Occidental Johannes Weinrich* , que ya había viajado a Cuba en 1980 y era miembro del Grupo de  Carlos*, fue juzgado en el año 2003. 

Dos cartas de Roque a la Stasi revelaron que se había reunido con Weinrich y Gerd Albartus*, alias "Kai ", miembro de las Células Revolucionarias (RZ), en la primavera de 1984. 

Los dos terroristas le pidieron apoyo a Roque e indicaron que eran responsables del atentado perpetrado a un tren que cubría la ruta Paris- Marsella*) en 1983.

 Dado que Roque no estaba disponible como testigo para el tribunal de Berlín, fue citado a declarar el General de División Damm, antiguo jefe del Departamento X (Relaciones Internacionales) de la Stasi. Damm confirmó que Roque era oficial del servicio de inteligencia cubano.

Entrevista*/ Polos Opuestos/ Maria Elvira Salazar/ García Vázquez ( 2008)

Roque regresó a La Habana en 1986 y continuó sus actividades operativas, pero como jefe de un departamento en la Dirección de Radio- Inteligencia del MININT.

* Juan Miguel Roque Ramírez.  Coronel de la Seguridad del Estado de Cuba.

*Poco después, también en 1987, Albartus fue invitado a Damasco por un grupo cercano al terrorista Ilich Ramírez. Ingenuamente aceptó la invitación, fue llevado ante un "tribunal" por Carlos y su "asistente" Weinrich, condenado a muerte y ejecutado. La justificación aducida, irónicamente, fue la supuesta colaboración con la Stasi

El Palestino: Historia de un infiltrado

"No obstante, la prueba más convincente que he visto, ha sido un documento de los archivos de la STASI alemana que mostró el investigador Jorge Luis García Vásquez, residente en Alemania, en un programa de la televisora de Miami llamado ¨Polos Opuestos¨, conducido por la periodista María Elvira Salazar. Ese documento es una carta de mayo de 1980 firmada por el Ministro de la Seguridad del Estado de la Alemania Oriental Erich Fritz Emil Mielke (Diciembre 28, 1907 – Mayo 21, 2000) , quien ocupó ese cargo desde 1957 hasta 1989, y dirigida al entonces Ministro del Interior, MININT, Sergio del Valle en que trasmite la preocupación de que miembros del comando de Carlos ¨El Chacal¨ tenían contactos con oficiales de la Inteligencia cubana, DGI"

Contexto histórico

Por

El 31 de diciembre de 1983, a las 20:09, la zona de consigna de equipajes de la estación de tren de Saint-Charles quedó devastada por la explosión de una bomba. El atentado causó la muerte de tres personas. Unos minutos antes, otra bomba había explotado en el tren Marsella-París, cerca de Tain-L'Hermitage, matando a dos personas e hiriendo a unas treinta.

Estos ataques se produjeron tras una serie de atentados contra Francia, tanto en su territorio como en el Líbano, el año anterior. Todo comenzó con un atentado con bomba en el Capitole, el tren que conecta Toulouse y París, el 29 de marzo de 1982, que causó la muerte de cinco personas. El atentado fue reivindicado por la Organización de la Lucha Armada Árabe, un grupo clandestino que había alcanzado notoriedad en 1975. Este grupo había exigido, en vano, al ministro del Interior, Gaston Defferre, la liberación de Magdalena Kopp y Bruno Bréguet, dos terroristas detenidos en París en febrero. Menos de un mes después, el mismo día en que fueron condenados a cuatro y cinco años de prisión, respectivamente, las oficinas del periódico Al Watan Al Arabi , en la Rue Marbeuf de París, fueron blanco de un atentado que dejó un muerto y alrededor de sesenta heridos. Este periódico había implicado a Siria en el asesinato del embajador francés en el Líbano en septiembre de 1981. Unos meses más tarde, el 9 de agosto, el restaurante Goldenberg, en la Rue des Rosiers, fue blanco de terroristas del grupo Abu Nidal, quienes mataron a seis personas e hirieron a una veintena.

Pero en aquel momento, los autores de los atentados del 31 de diciembre de 1983 eran desconocidos. Como suele ocurrir, surgieron diversas reivindicaciones de responsabilidad. No fue hasta el 4 de enero de 1984 que la Organización de Lucha Árabe se atribuyó la autoría. Detrás de este acrónimo se encontraba Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, conocido como Carlos, un terrorista de notoria reputación. Originalmente revolucionario sudamericano, se convirtió al islam en 1975 y se benefició del apoyo de varios servicios de inteligencia de Europa del Este y Oriente Medio. El motivo de los atentados no estaba claro. Francia se veía desafiada por su presencia en el Líbano, pero también porque mantenía en prisión a Magdalena Kopp, amante y cómplice de Carlos. Gastón Defferre, ministro del Interior, era un objetivo directo. Los atentados también pretendían contribuir a envenenar el clima político en Francia. Estos ataques se produjeron en un contexto de gran tensión, ya que el gobierno de izquierda atravesaba dificultades. La oposición, desplegando todos sus recursos, acusaba al gobierno de negligencia. El Frente Nacional aprovecha la oportunidad para exigir el restablecimiento de la pena de muerte. Para evitar la instrumentalización política, Gaston Defferre prohíbe todas las manifestaciones.

Carlos fue arrestado el 15 de agosto de 1994 en Sudán y extraditado a Francia, donde permanece encarcelado desde entonces. El Tribunal Especial de París lo condenó a cadena perpetua en diciembre de 1997 por los asesinatos de dos agentes de la DST (Dirección de Vigilancia Territorial) y un informante, ocurridos en 1975. Está previsto un nuevo juicio por estos otros delitos, pero no por los atentados de Marsella, que han prescrito.